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China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Africa, Debt Risk 
and New Dependency: The Case of Ethiopia 
ISTVÁN TARRÓSY 
Abstract: Acknowledging a growing new concern about China across the 
Global North in general, and in the U.S. in particular, in the context of China–
Africa relations, the article examines Ethiopia as a case study to understand 
the multi-faceted relationship. Based on field research in 2018-20, together 
with local media reports, it looks at some of the recent large-scale 
infrastructure projects in Ethiopia built by Chinese companies, in particular 
the Light Railway in Addis Ababa and the Ethiopia–Djibouti Railway. These 
will be analyzed in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) of 
China. Although the expansion of badly needed modern infrastructure, and 
thus enhanced connectivity, is welcomed by society at large, the following 
research questions are raised: (1) How difficult will the repayment of loans be 
for Ethiopia? (2) Is China offering a worse scenario than the Western practice? 
At the same time, what is the alternative to these Chinese loans for African 
governments at present? (3) What are the costs and benefits for both sides? In 
the process of measurable growing indebtedness—this time to China—the 
article will shed light on some new dependencies in the making.  
Introduction: Rising Debt Stress in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Over the last two decades China has become the largest trading partner for the entire 
African continent. This means that while in 2000 the total trade volume stood at 
US$10.6 billion, in 2018 it reached US$204.19 billion.1 In the year 2018, “the growth 
rate of China’s trade with Africa was the highest in the world.”2 In particular, 
commodity-dominated Chinese engagements have expanded greatly with Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA). In a fifteen-year timespan, from a negligible level in 2000, trade 
exponentially increased, together with Chinese direct investment having grown 
more than six-fold.3 According to the General Administration of Customs of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC), the country has kept its pole position globally in 
terms of trade of goods; the “volume with major trading partners increased, and 
trade with countries involved in the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI) saw a good 
momentum.”4 In 2018, an almost ten percent increase was registered by China 
Customs in total foreign trade deals and activities compared to that of 2017.5 Among 
others, the World Bank at the same time reports that one of the vulnerabilities in the 
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form of government debt-to-GDP ratios “are estimated to have risen in more than 
half of the [Sub-Saharan African] countries in 2018 and were above 60 percent in one-
third. […] In addition to the rise in debt ratios, changes in the composition of debt 
have made many countries more vulnerable to sharp movements in financing 
conditions.”6 
Dependency theorists are concerned with the primary argument that 
“overdependence of economies on international economic conditions over which 
they have little control results in debt accumulation of crisis proportions.”7 Although 
it may be early to talk about a “crisis,” an expression also used by Friedman and 
Snyder, it is certainly appropriate to note the emerging issues related to debt 
accumulation.8 The Overseas Development Institute (ODI), for instance, points out 
that the number of those Sub-Saharan African countries (SSACs) that are struggling 
to service their debts, as they are called those in “debt distress”, or are at “high risk 
of debt distress, has more than doubled since 2013”—meaning eighteen in all 
SSACs.9 “According to the World Bank, at the end of 2016, African governments 
owed US$130 billion of debt to other governments.”10 As long as almost one fourth of 
African government external debt is owed to China, this makes the Asian giant “the 
largest single creditor nation, with combined state and commercial loans estimated 
to have been US$132 billion between 2006 and 2017.”11 
Table 1. Maximum amount of African government external debt owed to different 
creditors12 
Creditor grouping  Total debt owed  % of external debt owed  
China  US$100 billion  24% 
Paris Club governments US$ 40 billion  10% 
World Bank  US$ 66 billion  16% 
IMF  US$ 18 billion    4% 
Other multilateral 
institutions  
US$ 61 billion  15% 
Private sector (excl. Chinese 
private sector)  
US$132 billion  32% 
Total  US$417 billion  [Figures add up to 101 percent 
because of rounding]  
Source: Jubilee Debt Campaign 2018, p. 7. 
The above-cited analyses and reports differ in their calculations (around US$10 
billion difference is touched upon), as the World Bank may not include all debt to 
China in its figures.13 As long as China “continues signing unconditional loans and 
contracts with a number of African states,” there are worries and concerns—
especially in countries and institutions of the Global North—that “Chinese loans 
would create a new wave of debt crisis for Africa.”14 
Friedman and Snyder underline that the “current situation resembles the 
African debt crisis of the 1980s. […] Over the past 10 years, amidst an environment of 
low global interest rates, African governments have likewise accumulated more 
debt.”15 There are marked differences, however, between the 1980s and today: 
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currently, more of SSA’s debt is private debt as opposed to concessional debt 
connected to multilateral institutions more than three decades ago, together with the 
dominant arrival of an assertive China offering, as Friedman and Snyder call it, a 
new “bartering system: In return for investment capital and infrastructure 
development projects, some sub-Saharan African countries grant China resource 
concessions.”16 Some reports claim that China’s massive loans financing 
infrastructure projects across the continent “can come with steep and opaque 
conditions.”17 In his article, Harris even talked about “Beijing’s carefully laid debt 
trap,” which the Chinese government obviously confidently rejected .18 Laterza and 
Mususa placed a firm criticism against Western allegations of such a “debt trap” by 
stating: “It is a tragic irony that China is being blamed by the West for allegedly 
doing exactly what the IMF has been doing for decades: providing unsustainable 
loans to countries in need to further plunge them into debt, weaken state capacity 
and open up national economies to international investors (primarily from Western 
countries).”19  
Recently, Deborah Brautigam underscored that the database of Johns Hopkins’ 
SAIS “has information on about more than 1000 loans and, so far, in Africa, [no] 
examples [were seen] where the Chinese deliberately entangled another country in 
debt, and then used that debt to extract unfair or strategic advantages of some kind 
in Africa, including ‘asset seizure’.”20 This latter statement has been echoed by 
leading experts including David Shinn, who in a recent report of the American 
Foreign Policy Council said that: “So far, China has not tried to seize assets from any 
African country that has failed to repay loans.”21 Therefore, although caution is 
required not to inflate the “debt trap,” it is to be acknowledged that African debt is a 
concern, and in fact, in general “there are valid reasons for heightened concern about 
Chinese engagement.”22 
Loans and Geopolitical Repositioning Along the BRI 
Trade dominates linkages along the Belt and Road (formerly called One Belt, One 
Road – OBOR): “the total trade between China and the OBOR nations in 2014-2016 
has surpassed US$3 trillion, and China’s investment in these nations has exceeded 
US$50 billion.”23 All these were supported by such tools as the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB), or the China’s Silk Road Fund. In fact, with the BRI, China 
“hopes to develop a vast network of land and sea routes that will connect its export 
hubs to far-flung markets.”24 Thus, it lays the strongest emphasis in its foreign policy 
on exports that are “vital to its economic and political success” on the global stage.25   
The Belt and Road Initiative is the ambitious vision of China to increase its 
connectivity also with the African continent, across which it has assertively managed 
gradually deeper engagements.26 This is especially since the launch of the Forum on 
China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000 and the release of the first official 
China–Africa policy white paper in January 2006 respectively.27 This is a composite 
geopolitical tool for enhancing China’s positions globally, recently gaining ground in 
Africa substantially. After each FOCAC meeting triennially the scale of Chinese 
assistance for African development projects are redesigned resulting in more diverse 
commitments and a wider funding framework. At the last Beijing summit in 
September 2018, President Xi Jinping announced another US$60 billion assistance to 
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Africa, provided mainly by the government but also by companies, focusing on 
investment financing by interest-free loans and concessional loans.28 The BRI is 
“China’s way of addressing the infrastructure gap. […] It is widely seen as one of 
China’s major overseas and economic policy goals which are likely to have a 
significant effect on Africa.”29 However, this has not been without adverse outcomes. 
Via infrastructure development projects, African states arguably enter dynamics that 
reproduce dependency—this time, from China.30 While Africans also need to engage 
in meaningful trade, strategic thinking as well as actual strategies for cooperation on 
the African side seem to be weak or missing. For instance this is evident when we 
look at recent Chinese infrastructure developments and the responses and 
perceptions to these projects by locals in Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Rwanda.31 
Attention needs to be directed towards the already mentioned approach of China to 
offer attractive loans that seem to indebt African governments to China over the long 
term. Nearly all the Chinese infrastructure funding in most African countries in the 
form of concessional loans has been channeled through the China EximBank 
(Chexim).32 The major characteristics of such Chinese loans are listed in Table 2. 
Fostering a “Going Global” strategy by 1999, China took confident steps to 
appear assertively on the international stage, which later offered a proper ground to 
launch its Belt and Road Initiative. The Chinese government explicitly urged both 
state-owned enterprises and private firms to penetrate local markets across the globe, 
taking advantage of a dynamic new phase of world trade and the hunger of 
developing regions for investments in infrastructure. President Xi Jinping’s 
leadership has been pushing the new initiative built on the ancient first Silk Road 
network from the Han dynasty also with the aim to improve and strengthen its 
geopolitical position in its immediate neighborhood, as well as in a larger regional, 
global context. “At its 2017 National Congress, the Chinese Communist Party went 
so far as to enshrine a commitment to the initiative in its constitution—a signal that 
the party views the infrastructure project as more than a regular foreign policy.”33 
According to the strategic advisory think tank China Policy, this global strategy also 
“frames China’s ambitions for global leadership and cooperation.”34  
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Table 2. The nature of Chinese concessional loans 
Major characteristics  Chexim concessional loans 
The deal structure “Resources for infrastructure” (known as 
the “Angola mode”): repayment of the loan 
for infrastructure development is made in 
terms of natural resources (e.g. oil).35 
 
Focus on Providing preferred lines of credit to 
Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 
foreign governments wishing to purchase 
‘Made in China’ goods  
 
Serving The national interest by supporting the ‘Go 
Global’ strategy of the Chinese government 
 
Terms and conditions Agreed on a bilateral basis 
 
Rates and time frames On average, the loans offer an interest rate 
of 3.6 percent, a grace period of 4 years, and 
a maturity of 12 years.  
(Overall, this represents a grant element of 
around 36 percent, which qualifies as 
concessional.) 
 
Requirements by China (tying of 
loans) 
– A Chinese enterprise be selected as the 
contractor or exporter 
 – No less than 50 percent of the equipment, 
materials, services, or technology needed to 
implement the project should be secured 
from China 
 
Overall grant element Often ranges from 10% to 70% 
 
Source: Executive Research Associates (Pty) Ltd 2009, pp. 78–79. 
 
The ancient Chinese viewed the surrounding world and China’s place and role 
in it as the “Middle Kingdom” at the core of the globe with subjects of the emperor 
and tributary states in its macro region, as well as the barbaric entities on the 
periphery (see Map 1), a view that has been reaffirmed with the BRI. Its connectivity 
network via the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road is clearly seen 
in geographic terms: positioning Beijing again as the center of gravity (see Map 2). 
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Map 1. The symbolic representation of the Middle Kingdom 
 
Source: https://www.quora.com/Why-does-China-call-itself-中国-i-e-central-middle-
kingdom-Other-countries-names-are-translated-to-Chinese-according-to-the-
pronunciation 
Map 2. Re-sewing the cobweb of connections: the BRI re-positions China 
 
Source: MERICS 2018  
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A report published by China Policy in April 2017 summarizes the systematic 
and strategic developments of China’s global expansion. After bidding farewell to 
the Mao-era mindset of self-reliance, later on gaining membership in the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, and having experienced (and survived with 
confidence) the global financial crisis in 2008–10, China embarked on the BRI. It 
focuses on building up infrastructure, trade, investment, and human linkages across 
Eurasia, connecting almost all regions of the world to a—according to the Chinese 
government, “peacefully rising”—Middle Kingdom of the 21st century.36 Africa is one 
of the target continents, where Chinese engagement has a long history by now.37 
Large-Scale Transport Infrastructure Projects and the Developmental State: Light 
Rail in the Capital and Railway Connection to the Sea 
The intention here is neither to systematically analyze the Ethiopian developmental 
state, nor to propose a new theoretical approach, rather to acknowledge the 
determining features of the existing model and use it as a framework of reference. At 
the same time, it is important to emphasize that there is a growing academic 
necessity to create a possible new framework embracing both “theoretical and 
methodological issues about how to advance the understanding of state-led 
structural transformation in Africa.”38 
Amidst a growing “China scare” across countries of the Global North, China has 
recently taken the forefront to build the sorely needed infrastructure that can 
enhance Africa’s connectivity across global networks.39 Indeed, from a debt 
perspective the “infrastructure-driven BRI has made infrastructure financing a key 
source of Sino-African debt.”40 Such an input about better and wider infrastructure is 
praised by substantial parts of local African populations. At the same time, the deals 
that finance such projects raise several questions, which the same local Africans often 
do not seem to be critically aware of. Their governments need to start to repay the 
“soft loans” provided by China, but in a growing number of cases their budgets 
struggle to cover them. Poku and Mdee rightly pointed out: “What matters is that a 
country has the capacity to repay. […] Debt service uses up foreign exchange (forex) 
from export earnings, so there is less forex available for imports that are necessary 
for growth and may be essential for social welfare, notably medicine. [… and] 
private investors will also be deterred by a country’s large debt burden.”41 It is 
important to note that while African governments are obviously aware of debt 
obligations, paying up plans might be ambitious and difficult to execute. Also, as 
“debt continues to grow in Africa, it is probable that Africans will scrutinize credit 
lines from China more closely. If the opacity of debt deals between China and 
African governments continues, this might be met with home-grown sinophobic 
narratives.”42 In fact, this is the case already in several member states of the East 
African Community, such as in Kenya. Even more dependencies—also dependence 
on Chinese knowledge and technology, e.g. spare parts and maintenance in general, 
as part of the infrastructure projects—may therefore be reproduced from such 
scenarios. The rise of new dependencies has already been discussed by scholars such 
as Ian Taylor (2014), and in terms of a “sub-imperialist logic” of behavior, by Patrick 
Bond (2015) and Justin Van der Merwe (2016).43 
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There are numerous examples of the tangible manifestation of China’s policy 
across Africa. Some recent large-scale projects have directed the spotlight on 
Ethiopia, where the Chinese presence has already been overwhelming: the first 
modern light railway (tram) system of Sub-Saharan Africa in the capital, Addis 
Ababa; or the Addis–Djibouti railway connecting the landlocked country to the 
maritime trade routes of the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea aiming at improving the 
country’s port access.44 These need to be looked at acknowledging the main features 
of Ethiopia’s developmental state, among which there is the construction of large 
projects, such as railways, highways, hydroelectric dams, and, more recently, the 
plan for the expansion of the capital city, known as the Addis Ababa Master Plan.45 
As of today, China is one of Ethiopia’s most prominent and dominant partners, 
drawing upon decades of cooperation.46 
In the 20th century, one of the first important moments of bilateral relations was 
the 1955 Asian–African Conference of Bandung, which contributed to the 
establishment of modern diplomatic ties between the two continents, and in 
particular, between Ethiopia and China. Following the trade, economic, and technical 
cooperation agreements of the early 1970’s, Sino-Ethiopian economic cooperation 
“grew modestly and remained low until 1995,” mainly due to the military rule in 
Ethiopia.47 “Especially since 1995, the bilateral economic cooperation witnessed 
marked progress and rapid development in different areas.”48 Since the beginning of 
the new millennium and the launch of the FOCAC mechanism in 2000, bilateral 
collaboration has been significantly expanding. Although “China is generally 
popular in Ethiopia,” local perceptions need to be distinguished from how the 
political elite and the government think about China. As Adem suggests, there is a 
“vertical Sino-optimism, which is the attractiveness of China to Ethiopia’s rulers,” 
and there is another “horizontal Sino-optimism, which is the attraction China 
commands among ordinary Ethiopians.”49 With increasing inbound Chinese 
migration tendencies at the same time, however, there is a gradually developing 
perception among certain groups of young people that there is already a sufficient 
cohort of Chinese individuals living and working in Ethiopia and local society does 
not really need more.50 In addition, Jalata and Mathews report that, “there is a 
general lack of trust about the quality of Chinese products and services,” and “there 
are also complaints among the locals that the Chinese people do not pay enough 
attention to their personal image.”51 All these are especially important to note for the 
sake of better understanding the presence of China in the daily Ethiopian realm, in 
particular, connected with large-scale infrastructure development projects. 
Clapham underscores that “patterns of state authority are critical to the 
development process,” and with Meles Zenawi’s regime from 1991 on, the 
articulation of “an ideology of development that drew heavily on the East Asian 
model, while adapting it to Ethiopian circumstances” proved decisive.52 The major 
inspiration for the Ethiopian “strong state” strategy was China.53 Indeed it drew 
upon “China as the single most important source of inspiration, […] and placed its 
greatest emphasis on providing the infrastructural conditions necessary for 
industrial development at the hands of private entrepreneurs.”54 In the last couple of 
years, in particular, with the arrival of Primes Minister Abiy Ahmed, Ethiopia is 
Debt Risk and New Dependency | 16 
 
African Studies Quarterly | Volume 19, Issues 3-4| October 2020 
http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v19/v19i3-4a2.pdf 
trying to agree on investment deals with a number of countries and not only China. 
Kelsall confirms that the country “has received billions of dollars in investment from 
Saudi Arabian, Indian, and Chinese investors among others [in different sectors 
including] electronics and textiles, [but also channeled into] agro-processing, energy, 
infrastructure, tourism, and mining.”55 Diversification of foreign affairs has become a 
key to the Abiy administration. Although the trade and investment relationship with 
China has stayed robust, as Marks reports, also “Western economies have finally 
arrived at the table alongside China, the Gulf States and Russia, which have all been 
maneuvering for influence in Ethiopia since its economy started to boom about a 
decade ago. One of the most visible pledges came in 2018 through a US$3 billion 
package of aid and investment from the United Arab Emirates.”56 
The construction of the light rail (tram) system started in December 2011 after 
securing funds from China’s Export-Import Bank. The final cost of the railway was 
US$475 million, 85 percent of which was covered by a substantial concessional loan 
from Chexim. It took three years for the China Railway Group Limited (CREC – the 
parent company China Railway Engineering Corporation) to finish the two-line, 
34.4km system. Trial operations started in February 2015, while the lines started to 
operate by September 20 and November 9, 2015 respectively. The original plan was 
to ease the overburdened traffic situation in the capital, but according to Tesfaye, it 
failed to do so.57 The number of those using the tram—around 110,000 daily 
passengers in a city of around seven million inhabitants—shows it has limited 
relevance: with very low ticket prices, the train is comparable to the cost of a bus ride 
but the light rail is overcrowded and the network reaches only certain parts of the 
city. The number of trams should be increased, but according to the news and locals, 
the system is limited because of power issues and even with the recent number of 
trams it runs infrequently or with single cars. Promises were made to install a 
dedicated power grid, but even this fails to fully power the system.  
In January 2019, part of the author’s field research, while travelling extensively 
in Addis, the cars were still crowded; nearly half of the trains were not available for 
service; and the timetable was still accidental.58 However, deep underneath 
something has changed: people have grown used to it. Although strategic planning 
about the complex utilization of such an infrastructure seems to be lacking or still 
vague, this urban rail has definitely started to attract investments close to the lines. 
Apartments, malls, businesses, and condos are being built, changing the landscape 
and revitalizing entire districts and helping small businesses. This is not surprising, 
as such a major infrastructure project can frequently function as core or pole of 
development encouraging other sectors to boost. Other examples can also prove this: 
because of their proximity to the Addis–Djibouti railway, two petroleum depots have 
been constructed and designed in the towns of Awash and Dukem respectively.59 
Improved connectivity and logistics, together with all possible engaging 
stakeholders, are the result of similar developments along other routes beyond the 
region, such as the Nairobi–Mombasa railway, or the Suez Canal corridor project.60 
In general, as Mohapatra underscored in a detailed cost-benefit analysis, benefits of 
such railway projects “will also come in terms of employment generation for 
unskilled labor during construction period, as well as to the skilled and unskilled 
professionals during the operation phase.”61 
17 | Tarrósy 
 
 
 
African Studies Quarterly | Volume 19, Issues 3-4| October 2020 
http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v19/v19i3-4a2.pdf 
 
The Addis–Djibouti railway is an almost 760-km railway connection between the 
capitals of Ethiopia and Djibouti, constructed between 2011 and 2016, financed by 
the Ethiopian Government and another Chexim loan. Details again are not quite 
clear, but according to the Ethiopian Embassy in Brussels 2016, the total construction 
budget reached US$4.5 billion, at least $0.5 billion more than was originally 
planned.62 According to various sources, Exim Bank offered a loan of US$2.4 - 3 
billion. In 2017, the Ethiopian Railway Corporation (ERC) faced financial issues 
without finishing the project and the connecting infrastructure on time. Anberbir 
reported that the ERC had a stunning US$3.7 billion debt at the end of 2016, and had 
already started to repay those loans before the railway connection was functional.63 
The ERC had “not only been unable to meet its loan repayments but also unable to 
front the remainder of the management fees for Chinese companies operating the 
railway.”64 As is the case with the Light Railway System, this railway is also operated 
by a Chinese company, in this case a consortium of two companies, CREC and the 
China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CRCC), which were responsible 
for the construction as well. Their job now is to operate and maintain the line, and to 
also train local personnel for an undisclosed fee until 2023. 
This project, similar to the Light Railway System, has challenges to meet its 
original goals, which has financial consequences as well. While the light railway was 
mainly constructed to ease the traffic issues, this railway was built to help the 
landlocked country to reach maritime trade routes, also to import much needed fuel, 
as well to boost the economy—and get connected to the BRI network, too. Failing to 
generate the income to repay the loans might have negative consequences on the 
ERC and on the future projects as well, not to mention on the Ethiopian government. 
As Chiwanza emphasizes, all these Chinese infrastructural development projects in 
Ethiopia (too) “are coming at a heavy price.”65 Ethiopia is number two in the top ten 
most indebted SSA countries’ list with an estimated Chinese debt of US$13.5 billion 
(see Graph 1). “The debt levels have slowed down some projects due to repayment 
issues, but there is now a new structure for these debts that makes it a little bit 
affordable for Ethiopia to repay.”66  
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Figure 1. Estimated indebtedness of US$billion to China 
   
Source: Chiwanza 2018, Onjala 2018 
The issue of maintenance and sustainable management that produces income 
and can ease the burden of repayment may, however, come as a heavier cost. The 
“little bit of affordable to repay” scenario cannot really help the country to get rid of 
its looming debt distress, in particular, when previous examples in Southeast Asia, 
notably in Sri Lanka, as well as in neighboring Kenya, present tangible danger in 
losing ground. In the case of Sri Lanka, the government needed to sign over 
Hambantota Port on a 99-year lease after it could not meet its debt commitments.67 It 
is important to underline, as Brautigam explains in detail, that the “evidence for this 
project being part of a Chinese master plan is thin.”68 The point here, however, is that 
inefficient companies cannot properly run such ventures, which further propels 
dependence on external borrowing. As Estaban also confirmed in the Hambantota 
case, the agreement “specified the creation of two public-private partnerships 
between China Merchants and the Sri Lanka Ports Authority, which would manage 
the Port’s administrative and commercial operations.”69 This is expected to result in a 
more efficient run port and substantial further investments. 
In the case of Kenya, it was reported that the port of Mombasa may be “lost” to 
the Chinese government “if Kenya Railways Corporation (KRC) defaults in the 
payment of Sh227 billion owed to Exim Bank of China,” referring to a disputed 
report by Auditor-General Edward Ouko.70 As in this latter case, also when reports 
were published about Zambia surrendering its Kenneth Kaunda International 
Airport to China for failing to meet its debt obligations, the government right away 
refuted such claims.71 However the actual bilateral negotiations between the 
respective African and Chinese parties will end, all these draw more attention to a 
possible new dependency scenario, which African governments need to deal with 
and get better prepared to find answers. Even if, as recent reports indicate, China 
may forgive some of the African debt, as in the case of Cameroon, concerning a not-
so-significant US$78 million sum. Critical voices say this is because China considers 
Cameroon as the gateway to the sub-regional market, which it wants to control.72 
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Conclusion 
The arrival of Abiy Ahmed as Ethiopia’s new prime minister in April 2018, along 
with numerous reforms in the country initiated by his government, seem to offer a 
more self-confident ‘African agency’ in terms of negotiating deals with the Chinese. 
In fact, the diversification of foreign relations, as well as looking beyond the Chinese 
state-led development model that the country has followed for years, have been put 
on the political agenda by allowing different options within the federal state.73 
“Deeper federalism could challenge certain elements of Ethiopia’s Developmental 
State model, which has relied on centralised policy control and often prioritises 
national development schemes over local concerns.”74 At the same time, Clapham 
warns that, “Ethiopia has run a massive balance-of-payments deficit, with 
merchandise exports at about 20% of imports.”75 There is an enormous “quest for 
capital,” which results in a “relentless search for ‘rents.’” Clapham continues 
underlining that “the constant excoriation of ‘rent-seeking’ raises questions about the 
role of actors beyond the state in bringing about the boost in production that must 
ultimately be at the heart of the developmental enterprise.”76 While the 
developmental state has been obsessed with ’value creation,’ i.e., unlocking 
development driven by the national interest, it has to keep infrastructure 
development high on the political agenda, as it lies in the heart of the developmental 
model.77  With regard to our first question about how difficult the repayment of loans 
will be for Ethiopia, we have shown not only the nature of the struggle on the 
Ethiopian side, but also the efforts of the government to find the way out. In 
February 2019, Prime Minister Abiy happily announced that the government 
successfully renegotiated the repayment period for sixty percent of its external debt, 
a big chunk of it deriving from the construction of the Addis–Djibouti railway.78 To 
turn the entire project into something financially more convincing, i.e. profitable, 
further extensions and supportive infrastructure will be needed. 
Africa’s prospects may be bright if there is proper connectivity into global 
structures, there are confidently managed societies, with improved leadership, and 
there is better governance. Many of the continent’s countries have been fostering 
complex and intensive relationships with China, which have continuously deepened 
and strengthened since the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949.79 China has a 
clear and well-articulated strategic policy towards the continent, where countries 
partnering with China have yet to translate their recognition of China’s importance 
into explicit China strategies.80 China-built infrastructure projects are obviously 
welcomed by African governments. As for the Ethiopian rail projects, other analysis 
is also shown that they “occur with connectivity and integration. BRI projects 
[therefore] enhance linkages and connectivity in the [East African] region.”81 
The question frequently asked, however, will stay with us: Can the “African 
agency” decide what the best option is, and under what circumstances can any such 
development should take place? As Su argued, African states are likely to require 
more than just portions of their limited budgets to complete repayment.82 We may 
not agree with Su’s view on “a brand-new type of neocolonialism,” but we can also 
point out African vulnerability, which is that in these cases in relation to Chinese 
infrastructure loans surely escalates African dependence on China. At the same time, 
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as Ethiopia shows, state capacities can increase and the state itself can get stronger in 
choosing good and better deals by external actors.83 To our second question we can 
confidently reply that China has been firmly contributing to building the badly 
needed infrastructure across the continent, and as a showcase country, in Ethiopia 
too. With several pitfalls, there come along numerous benefits, similarly to the case 
of other deals with other (Western) actors and practice. As Chen confirms, the 
Chinese concessions highlight a continuing debt-struggle, but they “also 
demonstrate the advantages and flexibility, that African governments can gain in 
working with China – if they can leverage it.”84 The major item here again is the 
strength and confidence of the “Africa agency” in any bargaining situation with any 
external actor. Former Tanzania President Jakaya Kikwete at a Chatham House 
conference again underscored that “Africa should and must exercise agency in 
international relations. […] We may be weak technologically, economically and 
militarily, but we are not helpless or hopeless.”85 
The Ethiopian case, at the same time, also presents some challenging scenarios 
both for African governments and local societies. Although the much-needed 
railway connections, together with the new ports and additional infrastructure 
developments, are all part of China’s comprehensive ‘Belt and Road’ vision, they also 
enhance Africa’s participation in global processes. More external development actors 
have been active across the continent, but it seems that China offers the easiest 
alternative. Many lessons, however, need to be learnt about how to manage 
disappointment and frustration, and how to demand proper behavior from any 
external actor on African soil. This can take us to some possible answers to our third 
question about the costs and benefits for both sides. So far, the BRI has not paid 
attention to such “soft” requirements. Recent eastern African examples will most 
probably push the Chinese government to seriously consider these aspect.86 Also, it 
will likely become increasingly more reactive to avoid being associated with negative 
headlines and commit its business entities and citizens to behave.87 At the same time, 
more careful and sound navigation among the different options available from 
different partners (also from Asia), together with more nuanced financial planning 
seemed to stay the preferred way forward for African development. With regard to 
the infrastructure projects particularly in Ethiopia, there are substantial losses 
registered for China, as “China’s main project insurer, China Export and Import 
Credit Insurance Corporation, known as Sinosure, also said it had lost more than 
US$1 billion on the Ethiopian-Djibouti railway.”88 Together with this there are 
several benefits for the Asian giant, as around four hundred of its companies 
registered over twelve hundred investments in the 2017/18 financial year, which 
proves how attractive and financially viable the Ethiopian market is for China.89 For 
Ethiopia, Chinese investments are needed for further development, and the Abiy 
Government has proven that it can overcome fears and weaknesses in terms of 
confidently renegotiating better conditions and deals with China. 
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